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I. INTRODUCTION
Landowners and developers typically assume that they can legally
proceed with grading and fill activities (for example, levelling property
in preparation for subsequent construction or other use) once the
necessary state and local permits are obtained. If a project will affect
wetlands,' however, section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA)2 may
require the landowner or developer to obtain further permission from
the U.S. Department of the Army's Corp of Engineers (Corps). Persons
who violate section 404 can face penalties of up to $25,000 per day of
violation and one year of imprisonment; the Corps may also order
violators to remove all unpermitted fill and any structures built on the
fill, and require restoration of the area to its preproject condition at
the violator's own expense.3 Even those persons experienced in dealing
with wetland regulations are caught by surprise with a Corps enforce-
ment order and subsequent penalties.4 All landowners, developers, and
I The term "wetlands" is defined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
include:
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circum-
stances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs,
and similar areas.
33 G.F.R. S 328.3(b) (1992). For a discussion of the rationale for regulating devel-
opment in wetland areas, see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
2 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1387 (1991) (amending the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816). For a description of § 404, see infra
part Ill. Authority to regulate wetlands is also provided by: the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 5 403 and 5 407 (1991); the Marine Pro:cction,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1413 (1991); and the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. 5 662 (1991).
33 U.S.C. S 1344(s) (1991).
Consider Bill Ellen, nonprofit wildlife rescue center operator and former cnvi-
ronmental engineer, who worked carefully with the Soil Conservation Service and the
Corps to secure thirty-eight permits for a project to convert a Maryland estate into a
103-acre wildlife sanctuary. After a new, expansive interpretation of the "wetlands"
definition was issued in 1989 (see infra, part IlI.B.2.a), however, the same Corps
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their legal representatives should therefore monitor the evolving federal
regulatory scheme and take steps to ensure accountability for any
significant changes. Environmental and community activists committed
to the preservation of wetland resources should be equally vigilant.
Existing statutory ambiguity under the CWA 5 reflects an enduring
conflict between economic development and environmental protection. 6
The struggle between these two forces has affected many development
projects in Hawai'i,' and in the nation as a whole. Sometimes land-
owners become subject to enforcement action because they are unaware
that their property contains wetland areas.8 Previously exempt prop-
official that Mr. Ellen had been working with ordered all work on the project stopped.
The pressure of deadlines under previously-signed subcontracts led to "mistakes" and,
ultimately, a jail sentence for Mr. Ellen. EPA's Most Wanted, WALL STREET JOURNAL.
Nov. 18. 1992, at A16. See also The Macl teil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast.
Jan. 1, 1993) (featuring Bill Ellen's plight).
I See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985)
(noting that Congress did not provide clear guidance under the CWA).
' Oliver A. Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands: The Army-EPA Memorandum of Agreement
on ,Mitgation Under the 5 404 Program, 20 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,212, 10,212 (June 1990).
For the direct quote from Mr. Houck on this point, see znfra text accompanying note
61.
. Set, e.g., Christopher Neil, Kailua hills ore alive with the sound of discord, SUNDAY
STAR-BLLETIN & AD'ERTISER, Jan. 17, 1993, at A27. Neil mentioned the withdrawal
of a development proposal by Kaneohe Ranch for the Hamakua Marsh after encoun-
tering stiff opposition from Kailua Neighborhood Board members and nearby residents
in June 1992, and discussed more recent opposition to a subsequent proposal to build
a retirement community and community center on the same site. Id.
A battle over development of the Ka'elepulu wetlands in windward O'ahu, which
hegan in 1978 with a prior landowner, was only recently resolved at substantial cost
to the current developer. See Letter from attorney Ronald Y. Amemiya to Honolulu
City Councilman John Henry Felix (Jan. 13, 1992) (on file with Ronald L. Walker,
Wildlife Program Manager for the State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources). Residents' objections to an application for an after-the-fact Corps permit
for the wetland fill resulted in a leveraged settlement wherein the developer must
spend S700.000 to mitigate for lost wetland acreage (S500,000 for habitat creation.
,nd S200.000 for permanent maintenance). Id. See also Thomas Kaser, Disputed Enchanted
LaAe project gets the go-ahead, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 13. 1991, at A14.
11 In 1986, after the community objected to the start of construction for a house
in the vicinity of Kawainui Marsh. the landowner abandoned his plans (which were
proceeding in accordance with a valid building permit up to that point) when told
that a section 404 permit was also required. Telephone Interview with Donna Kokubun.
President. Hawaii Chapter of the National Audubon Society (Nov 20, 1992).
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erties can also fall under the Corps' jurisdiction when a landowner's
own activities, or those of third parties (including federal, state, and
local government entitites as well as private parties), create artificial
wetlands on a particular site. 9 Even where the presence of wetlands is
recognized, however, the regulated community often remains uncertain
how to proceed. Unless regulators provide both large and small devel-
opers with greater predictability, the current guidelines and standards
will continue to deter vital investments.
From the perspective of environmentalists and other activists, on the
other hand, wetland regulations can represent a useful tool for thwarting
or temporarily stalling controversial projects.' 0 Delays and the added
costs of penalties and project modifications have been sufficient, in
some cases, to derail otherwise profitable ventures in the past." A
tSe Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding
Corps regulation of unintended wetland environments resulting from artificial or even
accidental property alterations).
,o Several individuals and groups, including Ho'okahe Wai Ho'oulu 'Aina (HWHA)
as caretakers of a kalo lo'i (taro farm) supported by an auwai (irrigation ditch) from
Manoa Stream, objected to plans for the development of a Hawaiian Studies Building
on the site because of adverse effects on these associated wetland areas (including
pooled water emanating from the nearby Wa'ahila culvert). Letter from Michael T.
Lee, Chief of the Corps Operations Division, to Gordon Matsuoka. State Public
Works Engineer for the Department of Accounting and General Services (Aug. 17.
1992) (on file with author). Initial statements by the Corps indicated that the filling
of all wetlands, including man-made wetlands such as the kato Io'i, auwai and Wa'ahila
ditch, is subject to the Clean Water Act. d. The Corps issued a cease and desist
order two months later, when it discovered that boulders, rocks, soil and grubbed
vegetation fell into Manoa Stream as a result of construction activities. Letter from
Michael T. Lee to Gordon Matsuoka (Oct. 16. 1992) (on file with author). The Corps
ultimately reversed its initial claim of jurisdiction with respect to the lo'i (as insignificant
and "relatively recent manmade water features," which are not normally located in
fastlands), auwai (also relatively small and constructed on normally fastland areas).
and Wa'ahila tributary (because it is "not designated on the Geological Survey map
as an intermittent stream" and is already culverted for 200 feet upstream from the
project). Letter from Lt. Col. James T. Muratsuchi. U.S. Army District Engineer. to
Gordon Matsuoka (Dec. 9. 1992) (on file with author). As of late January, 1993, the
project awaits approval of a S 404 permit for a proposed revetment to prevent further
accidental fill of the Manoa Stream. Id.
" For example, environmentalists have staved off a variety of development proposals
for Kailua's Kawainui Marsh, the state's largest wetland, including a 4 0 0-unit housing
project and a massive park built on filled land. Kawainui Marsh's future to be discussed.
J{ONOLULU STAR-BUI.LETIN, Sep. 23, 1992, at A5.
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particularly revealing example involves the development of a wetland
area wcst of Kapa'akea Homesteads on the island of Moloka'i, which
is the subject of ongoing litigation between the Corps and the site's
developer. 32
Conflict, however, is not inevitable under the current regulatory
regime. State and federal governments have worked out mitigation
plans and set-asides for protected wetland areas in some cases, effec-
tively balancing economic concerns with the conservation of wetland
functions and values.' 3 Creative conflict resolution is clearly possible
under the curr'nt regulatory system; nonetheless, controversies over
wetlands regulation persist because of uncertainty regarding tile relative
value ascribed to the economy versus the environment.
The friction between economic development and environmental pro-
tection received significant attention during the 1992 campaign for
President of the United States. The incumbents, President George Bush
and Vice President J. Danforth Quayle, sought to characterize their
Democratic opponents, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and U.S. Sen-
ator Al Gore, as radicals planning to protect tile environmt-nt at the
: See File No. 89-015. wirn the Corps' Pacific Operations Division at Fort Shafter.
in Hunc'lu. Hawai'i. In an area zoned for housing, the developer apparently ext-rtised
due diligence ir obtaining necessary county and state permits. for which the appropriate
federal agencies were also notified. Id Although a December 1976 Final Environmental
Impact Statement prepared for a flood control project at Kapa'akca inditated the"
absence of any endangered species, the sighting of a Hawaiian stilt by a Corps field
officer led to an enforcement action ;n 1989 halting the nearly rotopleted projett. Id
Subsequent offers by the developer to provide mitigation, tnvolving the creation of
larger wetland areas and payment of substantial monetary amounts, have been
summarily rejected by the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) Id Sr
also File No. 92-006 (concerning litigation over illegal fill activity in the Maunawili
wetlands on the island of O'ahu).
" Plans for the expansion of Azeka's Supermarket in Kihei. Maui (Kanaha Pond)
ran into trouble when the USFWS determined that the property. located near Kahana
Po-d. served as a habitat for stilts when -vet. Letter from Ernest Kosaka. USFWS
Field Supervisor. Pacific Islands Office. to I~t. Col. )onald T. Wynn. U.S. Army
Corps (Apr. 27. 1990) (on file with Ronald L. Walker. Wildlife Program Manager.
State of Hawai'i Department of Land and Natural Resources). Subsequent ttego tiati!-Is
led to a suitable compromise permitting construction while adequately protecting
valuable wildlife habitat, at a cost of approximately S470.000. Letter front l.t. Col
Donald T. Wynn to Ernest Kosaka (Nov. ?0, 1990) (on file with Ronald .. Walker.
DI.NR). See also supra note 7 (discussing adoption of a mitigation plan for development
of the Ka'elepulu wetlands) and infia text accompanying note 58 (listing important
wetland functions and values).
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expense of humans." The incumbents themselves were often accused
in the media of gutting vital environmental statutes in order to appease
big business.'" In 1991 and 1992, the Bush-Quayle Administration's
regulatory review body, the Council on Competitiveness, gained in-
creasing power and prominence as it battled to weaken federal envi-
ronmental regulations concerning wetlands, hazardous waste, and clean
air. 1b
After the 1992 election, the Clinton Administration eliminated the
Council on Competitiveness.' 7 Regulatory review under the Clinton-
Gore Administration might have shifted the balance of interests toward
environmental protection,'" but the administration's fundamental mes-
sage remained that economic and environmental policies need not bc
mutually exclusive.'9 The polarized reactions to the former Conpeti-
tiveness Council suggest, however, that the conflict between environ-
mental and economic interests will likely persist. 1'j Public willingness
See Michael Kranish and Scot Lehigh, Insults FI) as Clinton. Buth Tratel to Kr)
States, Bosro.N GLOBE. Oct. 30. 1992, at L President Bush rcferred t. Vie Presdenial
candidate A] Gore as "'Ozone Man," stating that "'Iihis guy is so far ofi in tir
environmental extreme. we'll be up to our neck in owls and out of wcurk fotr ectry
American. This guy is crazy. He is way out. far out, man.- Id
" Ste. e g, Dianne Dumanoski, Environment Not Gaining Ground )urng Carnpaign.
BosToN GLOBE. Oct. 4, 1992, at I
*l Id
' Gore lauds abolishment of rule-reoieu'ing body, HoNoL'Lu ADVERTSF.i,. Jan 23, 1993.
at Dl (citing Vice President Al Gore as stating that "'an existing review process under
the Office of Management and Budget will make sure businesses are not burdent-'d by
federal regulations"); see also Eric Pianin and David S. Hilzenrath. Cinton to frise
Major Deficit Cut; Short Term Stimulus, Tax Reduction Fade. WAS1,N;TO. POST. Jan 12.
1993. at A I (quoting Leon Panetta's assertion, during hearings on his own confirmatimn
as Director of the Office of Management and Budget. that Vite President Gore plats
to organize a new regulatory review panel).
'" Vice President Gore believes that the United States should utilize "every means
... to preserve and nurture our ecological system." Albert Gore. EAR-rit iN TiiI.
BALANCE (1992) (cited in Bruce S. Klafter, Bujinesiet Should flead (;ore'j Manifeuto. SA.N
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 30, 1992, at B3).
" Dumanoski, supra note 15. Bill Clinton acknowledged that he had put jobs ahead
of the environment as Governor of Arkansas. but also stated that in the process he
learned that this is a "false choice " Id.
2" The Bush Administration's efforts to balance the conservation ethic with the
competing interests of the regulated community were reminiscent of the effort to
vindicate private property rights under the Regulator) Reform Task Force led by then
Vice President Bush. Houck, supra note 6. at n. 10 (citing Exc. Order No. 12291.
48 Fed Reg. 21.466 (1983)).
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to accept executive influence over regulatory policy-making (also known
as executive oversight) has its limits, whether economic development
or environmental protection is the motivating factor.2' Both the proper
role of the executive branch in this evolving process and the appropriate
standard for judicial review of such issues require careful analysis.
This comment begins by considering the propriety of executive
influence on regulatory policy governing wetlands.'- Part II critically
examines the mandatory deference model provided by the United States
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,-: and considers the potential application of this model through
judicial review of evolving wetlands regulations under section 404 of
the Clean Water Act (CWA). This comment argues that despite section
404's recognized ambiguities, overly-deferential judicial review is in-
appropriate, especially where proposed regulatory changes are appar-
ently inconsistent with existing interpretations of the CWA." Any
Consider the growth in size and influence of the "'Wise Use Coalition.' estab-
lished to oppose environmental regulations adversely alecting human social condi-
ions-;espccially as related to jobs and American competitiveness. As a legislative staff
mcmlber to U.S. Sen John BIreaux. durit g the first session of the 102nd Congress.
the atuthor observed a conct'rted lobbying elbr called the "Fly-in fur Frceclom."
Fishing, logging. honlebuilding. and othcer industries lobbied against environmental
protection bills and fnr a greater accoinolation of economic concerns. Some of the
environncntal statutes scheduled for reauthorization in 1993. and therefore possibly
subject to similar lobbying pressure, include the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. S 1251-
1387 (1991), the Fishery Conservation and Managcnent Act, 16 U.S.C. 55 1801-
1882 (1991), and the Endangered SpCc itrs Act. 16 U.S.C. 5! 531-1544 (1991). See
1to New York v. Reillv. 969. F.2d 11417 (.C. (:ir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs' challenge
of EPA-issued (:lean Air Act regulations allegedly altered in respun% to the' wishes of
the Compctitiveness Council)
U ndcr President George Bush and Vice President J. Danforth Quayle. the
Council on Competitiveness and the Vhite House )omestic Policy Council significantly
impacted proposals to reformulate wetlands policy under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act. Richard S. Stinger. ALI. I,1.7 .ViRONEti.NTAi. ACTION.. Nov.-Dec. 1991.
at 12-14.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Existing intterpretations of the CVA suggest that the balance of interests under
this statute favors cnvironnental protection over economic development. Set United
States v Riverside Bavview Homes. tnc.. 47,4 U.S. 121 (1985) (recognizing the
breadth of congressional concern for protec tion of water quality and aquatic ecosystems.
especially wetlands, and noting their central value in the hydrologic cycle); Smithwick
v Alexander, 12 E.v-rt.. L. RFi,. 20,432 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding the balance tilting
decisively in favor of wetlands protection); see also Jeffrey M. Lovely. Comment.
Protecting WIetlands Consideration of Secondary and Social and Economic Effects by the United
iu University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 15:23
agency decision-making process that merely reacts to the views of the
executive branch lacks independence and effectively violates democratic
principles of accountability. Part III reviews the historical evolution of
section 404 in order to support Part II's conclusions regarding statutory
ambiguity, accountability, and independence. Subparts A and B of
Part III cover the periods before and after introduction of the "no net
loss" policy for wetlands. The no net loss policy appeared, initially,
to unify competing wetland perspectives.2" Later, the phrase simply
highlighted a fundamental conflict between developers and conserva-
tionists that is enshrined in the statute.2 "
After laying these foundations, this comment turns to the task of
offering recommendations to ensure accountability for future agency
decisions. Part IV echoes the suggestion of Northwestern University
School of Law Professor Thomas Merrill that courts should review
regulatory changes through precedent-based judicial deference to the
executive branch. 27 Professor Merrill's "executive precedent" model
States Army Corps of Engineers in its Wetlands Permitting Process, 17 B.C. F,%VTL. Ati: l.
REV. 647, 677-78 (1990) (stating that the CWA was "enacted to protect the natural
environment," not to decide bctveen the economic interests of alternative sites as a
matter of public policy) (citing Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561,
573 (D.Mass. 1987)). Contra Hoffman Homes. Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency. 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.), vacated to facilitate settlement negotiations. 975 F.2d
1774 (7th Cir. 1992). cited infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text; see also infra note
49 for an interpretation of the CWA suggesting that the phrase "'unacceptable adverse
impacts" at 33 U.S.C. 5 1344(c) arguably indicates Congress' willingness, to a~ccpt
some adverse wetland impacts. for example, when the balance of interests favors
economic development.
Other statutes demonstrate that Congress knows how to give economic interests
higher priority than environmental protection. or at least an equally balanced consid-
eration. See infra notes 45 (highlighting a statutory provision designed to prevent
economic disruption or unemployment), 46 (cataloging environmental statutes that pay
greater attention to economic interests by calling for cost-benefit analyses). 91 (noting
that sonic environmental protection statutes simply establish long term goals), and 92
(listing environmental protection statutes that require a balanced consideration of
economic interests).
'" See infira note 84 (citing the National Wetlands Policy Forum as the genesis for
a consensus strategy on the regulation of wetlands).
See infra part III.B I
'-.See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L. J. 969 (1992). Professor Merrill's expertise in this area comes from his 1987 to
1990 service as Deputy Solicitor General. Department of Justice. when he argued or
helped brief a large number of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the "Chevrorr
doctrine." Id. at 969.
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achieves many of Chevron's regulatory-efficiency goals, but refuses to
sanction executive influence unchecked by meaningful judicial review.
Part V provides two more immediate remedies. First, subpart A
recommends legislation requiring the disclosure of an agency's rationale
for succumbing to executive oversight. Then, subpart B draws upon
analogous criticisms of Clean Air Act (CAA)28 developments in order
to encourage explicit clarification of Congress's intent. Congressional
reauthorization or amendment could provide a viable opportunity to
replace the ever-shifting political rhetoric between economic and envi-
ronmental concerns with a more stable, harmonious regime.
II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE UNDER CHEVRON
In enacting the CWA, Congress sought to provide uniform water
quality protection to a broad scope of areas with inherently different
functions and values. 29 Unfortunately, the original legislative drafters
lacked the scientific knowledge necessary to determine appropriate
standards. The resulting delegation of authority was necessarily ambig-
uous.30 Before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,31 courts generally applied
"discretionary deference" (based on an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review) to agency interpretations of ambiguous laws.3 2 After
" Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. 55 7 401-7 6 71q (1991).
- Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387 (1991)).
b' Merrill, supra note 27, at 997 (noting that similarly ambiguous delegations are
found in many other statutes establishing jurisdictional or boundary limitations). See
also Solid State Circuits v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 812 F.2d 383 (8th
Cir. 1987) (discussing alleged violations of constitutional due process presented by the
inability to weigh, in advance, the probable validity or applicability of a CERCLA
clean-up order, given that the statute imposes treble liability for failing to comply with
a valid order). In Solid State Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
characterized the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA, or Superfund). 42 U.S.C. 55 9601-9675 (1988). as "in some
circumstances .. . silent or ambiguous." Id. at 392.
" 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that the EPA's interpretation of the term "stationary
source," as permitting polluting-facility owners to treat all emitting devices as if they
were under a single "bubble," represented a valid construction of the Clean Air Act).
" Cf. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (applying a "hard look" standard to hold that a decision by the
Secretary of Transportation. rescinding a passive automobile restraint requirement,
was arbitrary and capricious because it was not supported by a reasoned analysis).
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Chevron, however, the courts can apply "pure deference" to these
interpretations when Congressional direction is imprecise. The pure
deference standard effectively precludes full judicial consideration of
the substantive issues associated with policy disputes."" For example,
the ambiguity inherent in section 404 could theoretically prevent the
judiciary from determining whether expansive executive oversight un-
duly influences agency decisions."
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that
agencies "may within the limits of [congressional] delegation, properly
rely upon an incumbent administration's views of wise policy" to
inform its judgments." Where Congress has "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue," the Court will adopt and enrl'ce that
answer; if the statute is ambiguous, however, judicial review shifts into
a pure deference mode, which permits agencies to "fill the gap" with
any reasonable construction of the statute." In effect. "administrative
actors become the primary interpreters of federal statutes and [courts
arej relegateld) to the largely inert role of enforting unambiguous
statutory terms. '"'
Professor Merrill criticizes the Court's expressed rationale for adopt-
ing a restrictive, deferential framework in Chevron. Th' court justifies
deference to the executive branch by invoking democratic principles of
accountability.3 Merrill suggests, on the other hand. that this expli-
" Merrill. supra note 27. at 1002 (arguing thai contextual laWtors. ;uh as the
degree of the agency's expertise and the exist'nte of reliane interes titl it.iced by
the agency's interpretation. are ignored by the cotirt,;)
" See generally id. (noting that Chron (an be read to require nandlator, tlelerente
to agency interpretations %shere Congress prov-dthd amrbiguous% ' a tutor" quldanic(c). ,er
also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
" 467 U.S. at 865-66. The disputed issue in Cha ron could be wen a, part of the
deregulatory thrust of the early Reagan Administration Merrill. ,upra not' 2b. at 975.
set also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-59. In response to the wishes of the Reagan
Administration, the EPA "'interpreted the tern% "%titontrv source' in the (lean Air
Act to permit owners of polluting facilities to treat all ctnittiint: de.i tes a, ii the% wert'
under a single 'bubble.' thereby minimizing the cots ol conplying %%jil the e'mission
standards" established by the Act. Id at 975-76 (citing 467 U S at 841) 'lie Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the I'A', interpsetataon.
in a prior stage of the litigation, largely berausc it -was contrary to prior precedent
Merrill, supra note 26, at 989.
Id. at 842-45.
" Merrill, supra note 27. at 969-70.
See id at 978-79 (suggesting that the Court viewed "'agenry de(isionmaking [as]
always more democratic than judicial decisionmaking because all age:x i's arc afcount-
able . .. to the President [who is elected by the people]")
1993 / WETLAND POLICY
cation is based upon a "fictitious delegation" of legislative power from
Congress to executive agencies. " According to Merrill, this "dubious
fiction ... threatens to undermine [the functional theory of separation
of powersj the principal constitutional constraint on agency misbehav-
ior.""' CheLron effectively permits agencies not only to make policy
within the limits of their organic statutes, but also to define these
limits. 4'
Despite Chevron's apparent holding that an implementing agency may
change regulations simply by articulating a rational basis for its deci-
sion, courts should assume (unless Congress expressly provides to the
contrary) that Congress expects agencies to apply their experience and
expertise when reformulating regulatory policy. The secrecy inherent
in the executive oversight process, however, often produces incomplete
administrative records and furthers hidden agendas. The courts should
not, therefore, use Chevron to validate rulemaking that is no more than
a response to political choices."'
Admittedly, the challenged regulatory about-face by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) in Chevron took place pursuant to a
new philosophy introduced by President Ronald Reagan.4 " The Court
expressly determined, however, that the EPA's decision was a "rea-"
sonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests."4 The Court
noted, in addition, that Congress "sought to accommodate the conflict
between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements to
continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality. ' '4 1
Correspondingly, the courts could logically extend this reasoning to
Id. at 1014.
Id at 998: ser also id at 994,
Id. at 997.
See Margaret Gilhooley, Executivr Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing
the Impact. 25 lkot. I.. Rr.v 299. 303 (1991). Consider New York v. Reilly. 969 F.2d
1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992). in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected the allegation that the EPA improperly relied upon the views of the
Competitiveness Council when it abandoned proposed rules under the Clean Air Act.
The court held that the EPA's decision to omit materials separation requirements
(designed to control industrial emissions) was adequately supported by the administra-
tive record Ritllj-. 969 F.2d at 1149-51. The agency based its decision on uncertainty
over associated costs, as identified through testimony by the U.S. Conference of
Mayors' National Resource Recovery Association. Id
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-59.
Id. at 865.
Id at 851 The Clean Air Act contains a provision entitled "Measures to prevent
economic disruption oi unemplorrnent." 42 U.S.C. 5 7425 (1991) (emphasis added).
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support increased consideration of economic factors in the regulation
of wetlands. A careful consideration of the language, policies, and
history of the CWA, however, suggests that Congress intended broader
protection of water quality than air quality. Whereas other environ-
mental protection statutes pay significant attention to cost-benefit anal-
yses, 46 reflecting Congress' intent to accept certain risks to human
safety and environmental degradation, an equivalent commitment to
balancing economic and ecological concerns is not readily apparent in
the CWA. 47
Potential judicial analysis of section 404 policy decisions is compli-
cated, however, by the ambiguity generally associated with wetlands
regulation. Proponents of President Bush's Wetland Protectio: Plan48
could argue that Congress did not intend the CWA as a full wetland
protection measure; in other words, the Act was designed only to
protect those ecosystems that serve important water quality functions.4
- See, e.g., the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. S§
136-136y (1991) (accepting, implicitly, that environmental and other harms associated
with pesticides are outweighed by their beneficial uses); Coastal Zone Management
Act. 16 U.S.C. S 1454(b)(7) (1991) (balancing ecological, cultural, historic and esthetic
values as well as needs for economic development); National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 4331(b)(5) (1991) (recognizing the government's responsibility to
achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards
of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities); id. 5 4332 (1991) (recognizing,
indirectly, the need to consider economic and technical factors when analyzing impacts
on the human environment); Solid Waste Disposal Act (as amended by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(2) (1991) (recognizing that
economic and population growth needs require increased industrial production).
" Compare supra note 24 and infra part III.A.1 (discussing the congressional com-
promise between economic and environmental concerns under the Clean Water Act.
in other words, bifurcating administrative authority under both the Corps and EPA)
with supra notes 45-46 and infra notes 91-92 (noting that statutory guidance concerning
the appropriate balance between these competing interests under the CWA is not as
specific as other statutory references, including cost-benefit analyses and other balancing
tests). A possible explanation for this difference is that Congress acted upon a perceived
need for broader protection against human impacts on water resources, as opposed to
impacts on the air.
" Fact Sheet from the White House Office of the Press Secretary. Protecting America's
Wetland (Aug. 9. 1991) (on file with the aurthor) [hereinafter President Bush's Wetlands
PlanI.
"' See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1991). The Administrator of the
EPA is authorized to veto any permit issued by the Corps for the discharge of dredged
or fill material:
whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings, that
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Advocates for this proposition might draw support from the United
States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes,50 which noted that section 404 provides ambiguous guidance.5 '
Given a hypothetical decision by the EPA to increase the scope of
allowable adverse impacts on wetlands,5 2 therefore, the Riverside decision
could serve as precedent for judicial deference, h ]a Chevron, to this
new interpretation of the CWA's statutory mandate. Under Chevron, a
restrictive EPA interpretation of the CWA would apparently be entitled
to deference."1 The decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency lends
additional support to claims for limited section 404 application. The
Seventh Circuit interpreted Riverside restrictively to support its holding
that the CWA does not either explicitly, or through delegation of
Congress' constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce (under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution), authorize regulation of all
wetland resources?5
the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacteptable adverse
effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.
Id. (emphasis added). The phrase "unacceptable adverse effect" could be interpreted
as an indication of Congress' willingness to accept some adverse wetlands impacts,
notwithstanding the CWA's general commitment to environmental protection. See also
40 C.F.R. S 231.2(e) (1991) (codifying the EPA's veto authority through regulations
covering any adverse impact resulting in the significant loss of, or damage to. wildlife
habitat).
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
' ld. at 132.
President Bush arguably sought to implement this decision in his Wetlands
Protection Plan. supra note 48. See also infra subpart III.B.4 (discussing the growing
tide of economic conservativism in the United States, and the corresponding desire
for an interpretation of scction 404 that provides greater consideration of economic
interests).
" See. e.g.. New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting
plaintiffs' allegation that the EPA improperly relied upon the views of the Competi-
tiveness Council when it abandoned proposed rules under the Clean Air Act).
11 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (invalidating EPA's regulation defining waters of
the United States to include isolated wetlands). On Sept. 4. 1992, this decision was
vacated upon grant of rehearing, to facilitate settlement negotiations. Hoffman Homes
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (Hoffman Homes I), 975 F.2d 1774 (7th Cir.
1992).
" Hoffman Homes, 961 F.2d at 1311, 1320 (finding that isolated intrastate wetlands
are excluded from federal regulation, and potential use of such wetlands by migratory
birds is insufficient to invoke federal regulatory authority), cf Leslie Salt Co. v. United
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Overly-deferential analysis under Chevron, however, constitutes little
more than a rubber stamp for otherwise questionable administrative
procedures. Agencies adopting any regulatory changes pursuant to
executive oversight should support these changes with detailed expla-
nations of their rationale for succumbing to outside views. Regardless
of the merits associated with the Bush Administration's attempt to
inject greater balance in section 404, the process that generated Pres-
ident Bush's Wetlands Plan remains disconcerting for two reasons: (1)
influence was applied behind closed doors, not in public hearings; and
(2) increased attention to economic concerns is apparently inconsistent
with existing statutory interpretations of section 404. 'b Given the high
stakes of the wetlands debate, and the potential for continued polari-
zation of the environmental and economic constituencies, administrative
efforts to modify existing wetland regulations should avoid the appear-
ance of impropriety that surrounded the Competitiveness Council.
Attempts to harmonize environmental and economic interests under
the Clean Water Act must adhere to democratic principles of account-
ability and be immune from undue influt-nce.
III. THE EVOLUTtON OF SECTION 404 WETLAND POLICY
Part II, above, argued that broad judicial deference with respect to
changes in wetland regulations is inappropriate, despite statutory am-
biguity, because of deeply-ingrained democratic values related to in-
dependence and accountability under our system of government. A
review of section 404's historical development provides a better under-
standing of the underlying inconsistencies associated with wetlands
regulation. This part also illustrates the fact that executive oversight
can change regulatory policy without sufficient public accountability.
In the past, most people viewed wetlands as wastelands, a home to
mosquitos, ooze, and pestilence, that were to be "diked, drained, and
filled in for housing developments and industrial complexes, converted
States. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
regulatory jurisdiction over man-made wetlands and wetland areas having the potential
to serve as migr-tory bird habitat).
C Gompare supra notes 24 and 46 (indicating (i) a broad concern by Congress for
water quality protection, especially with respect to wetlands. (ii) a rejection of cost-
benefit balancing under the CWA. as compared to other environmental statutes which
require such analysis. and (iii) that the balance of interests will. in any event, tilt
decisively in favor of wetland protection.) wtM supm note 45 and infra notes 91-92
(listing statutes that employ cost-benefit analyses and other flexible approaches to the
conservation and management of resources in an effort to balance economic antl
environmental impacts equitably).
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to farmland, [or] used as receptacles for household and hazardous
waste. ' ' Eventually, heightened awareness revealed wetlands as sen-
sitive transitional areas with subtle intrinsic values, serving vital envi-
ronmental functions such as ground water recharge; flood and sediment
control; prevention of shoreline erosion and saltwater intrusion; wildlife
habitat formation; water quality maintenance; enhancement of biolog-.
ical productivity; and provision of recreational opportunities.18
Despite numerous benefits furnished by wetlands and continuing
losses of such areas, however, federal wetland initiatives do not provide
comprehensive protection for this vital natural resource. For example,
high value wetlands are lost every year because activities such as
draining, excavating and channelizing are not regulated. 59 Section 404,
which requires permits for the placement of dredge and fill material in
the waters of the United States, is the most important federal regulatory
program for wetland protection. The ambiguous Congressional guid-
ance provided in this legislation, however, allows a divisive conflict to
persist.
A. Before the No Net Loss Policy
Despite progressive regulatory revisions, and almost twenty years of
litigation, section 404's competing constituencies, i.e. developers and
conservationists, remain polarized as the nation's wetland resources
continue to dissipate. A bifurcated administrative structure under sec-
tion 404, divided between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
and the EPA,60 provides:
a recipe for endless conflict between those who would protect what is the
United States' most productive and endangered ecosystem-its wet-
lands-and those who would exercise their most fundamental economic
right-to develop the land they own. 6'
1. Institutionalized conflict and uncertainty
Congress awarded administration of the section 404 permit program
to the Corps, based on that agency's previous experience with permit
Barbara Sleeper, Wetlands, Wonderlands, ANiMALS, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 12. See also
Steven L. Dickerson, The Evolving Federal Wetland Program, 44 Sw. L. J. 1473, 1474
(1991).
Sleeper, supra note 57, at 12-13; Dickerson, supra note 57, at 1474-75.
SDickerson, supra note 57, at 1496.
Set infra part III.A.I.
Houck, supra note 6, at 10,212 (emphasis added).
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programs in navigable waters.62 In addition, the EPA can veto any
Corps permit that would "adversely affect municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds, and fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas." 6"
This bifurcated structure reflects Congress'. compromise between the
values of economic well-being (the Corps' primary mission) and envi-
ronmental protection (the EPA's mission).6'
The resulting procedural uncertainty is accompanied by substantive
ambiguity; section 404 does not clearly define its jurisdictional limits.
The statute merely authorizes Corps permits for placement of dredge
and fill material in the "waters of the United States." ' 65 Wetlands are
neither defined nor specifically addressed in the CWA; the Act's goal
is simply "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters.""
2. Judicial expansion of section 404 jurisdiction
Initially, the Corps limited its scope of authority under section 404
to traditional navigable waters. 6' Public interest environmental groups,
however, sought greater ecosystem protection. In the landmark decision
National Resources Defense Council v. Callaway,6' fulfilled the environmental
community's -hopes. -As a result, the term "navigable waters" under
the CWA now encompasses all waters of the United States within the
reach of the Commerce Clause.
" See. eg., Rivers ard Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 55 403, 407 (1991);
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended 1965, 16 U.S.C. 5 662 (1991); and
Marine Protection. Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 33 U.S.C. 5 1413 (1991).
" Shannon J. Kilgore. Comment, EPA's Role in Wetlands Protection, Elaboration in
Bersani e. U.S. EPA. 18 ENvTL. L. REp. 10,479, 10,481 n. 16 and accompanying text
(Nov. 1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 1236, 92nd Cong.. 2d Sess. 141-42 (1972)).
1 Id. at 10.480. But see Benjamin H. Grumbles & Kenneth J. Kopocis, Water
Resources Acts- Developing an Environmental Corps, 21 ENV-rL. L. REp. 10,308 (June 1991).
The Water Resources Development Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-640, 104 Stat.
4604. established environmental protection as a primary mission for the Corps, Id. at
10.309, 10.314-21. The Wetlands Research Program established by the Corps also
indicates increased environmental sensitivity in this agency. See U.S. ARM" ENGINEER
WATERWAYS EXPERIMEXT STATION, THE WETLANDS RESEARCH PROCRAM (1991) (bro-
chure on file with author).
, 33 U.S.C. S 1362(7) (1991).
- 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a) (1991).
33 C.F.R. 5§ 209-210(d)(1) (1974).
- 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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The Corps' regulatory jurisdiction applies to interstate waters (in-
cluding wetlands), waters affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
tributaries thereof, and wetlands adjacent thereto.69 The crucial element
in defining Corps jurisdiction is whether or not a particular saturated
area (wetland) is hydrologically connected to a navigable water of the
United States. After promulgation of the Callaway decision, supporters
of the Corps' prior, more limited application of section 404 sought to
reinstate the old interpretation through congressional amendment.
3. Congressional reaction
In 1977, Congress rejected efforts to limit the jurisdictional scope of
section 404 to traditionally navigable waterways and their adjacent
wetlands.!" Although the House of Representatives passed such a
limiting measure," the Senate defeated a parallel amendment.72 The
debate centered on wetland preservation issues."
Proponents of limited jurisdiction argued that the inclusion of non-
navigable waters far exceeded congressional intent; opponents asserted
that a narrower definition would exclude vast stretches of crucial
wetlands to the detriment of wetland ecosystems, water quality, and
the aquatic environment generally.74 The statute, however, exempted
certain agricultural, forestry, ranching and other operations." In spite
of these clarifications, section 404 still causes uncertainty and confusion.
4. Judicial perpetuation of institutional conflict
The judiciary finally reviewed the bifurcated decisionmaking author-
ity created under section 404 in Bersani v. Robichaud.'6 The holding by
See supra note I for the Corps' current definition of wetlands.
See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-I1 (1977).
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4424. 4475-80.
" United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985)
(citing H.R. 3199. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess., S 16 (1977)).
Riverside Bay'iew, 474 U.S. at 136 (citing S. 1952. 95th Cong., Ist Sess., S 49(b)
(1977)).
" 123 CoNrG. REC. H10,426-36, S26.710-29 (1977).cited in Riverside Bayview, 474
U.S. at 136.
"* Id.
Dickerson. supra note 57. at 1478 (citing 33 U.S.C. S 1344(0(1)(A) (1988)). But
fee 5 1344(f)(2) (prohibiting recapture, or new uses, that affect the reach or circulation
of wetlands).
" 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed, however, to clarify
the law. Although Bersani implicitly approved EPA's "practicable al-
ternatives" test" over the Corps' "public interest review" test," the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found only that EPA's
interpretation was reasonable. 9 The court expressly declined to rule
that EPA's position was entitled to deference. "
According to one commentator,
It his system of permit review is duplicative, cumbersome and inconsis-
tent. The Corps is given the task of serving two masters, while it lacks
the tools to fully satisfy either one. Consequently, the Corps' permitting
process often times produces unsatisfactory and inconsistent results."
This conclusion is reinforced by observations that the judiciary has yet
to provide reliable guidance for the Corps, remanding section 404
permit decisions both for considering and for failing to consider eco-
nomic factors. 2
5. Inconsistent agency determinations of wetland jurisdiction
A final example of the uncertainty which existed prior to the "no
net loss" standard is revealed by the divergent agency perspectives on
how to identify wetlands for jurisdictional purposes. The identification
of wetlands is also referred to as delineation, or defining the scope of
authority under section 404. The original Corps and EPA delineation
manuals were both based on a muhipararneter approach. "" The manuals
" Bersani, 850 F.2d at 39. The court determined that the Corps must, during its
permit review process, avoid the development of wetland areas if possible, by first
considering the economic feasibility of alternative sites regardless of ownership. Id.
Id. at 39-40. The court balanced the benefits of a proposed development-
including economic considerations and the right to reasonable private use-against
potential d:.mage to wetland resources, in order to secure both adequate protection
and reasonable utilization of environmental resources. Id
" Id. at 46.
"Id. at 45 (noting that the court was "not thoroughly persuaded that EPA's
interpretation was entitled to deference"); see also Kilgore, supra note 63, at 10.487-
88.
"' Dickerson, supra note 57, at 1486.
See, e.g.. Lovely, supra note 24, at 668, 673-78 (citing Mall Properties. Inc. v.
Marsh, 672 F.Supp. 561 (D.Mass. 1987), appeal dsmissed. 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (Ist Cir. 1985);
Hough v. Marsh, 557 F.Supp. 74 (D.Mass. 1982)).
' Thomas A. Sands, Comparison of 1987 Corps Wetland Delineation Manual and
the 1989 Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Wetlands (1991) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author). According to this paper, Mr. Sands was principal
author of the original U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Wetland Delineation Manual,
REcooNIZING WETLANDs (1987). Id. at I.
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emphasized that all three of the following technical criteria must be
met for an area to qualify as a wetland: wetland vegetation, hydric
soils and hydrology. 84 Again, the crucial element justifying jurisdiction
was the hydrologic link to, and potential adverse effect upon, navigable
waters of the United States.
Evaluation of the wetland indicators mentioned above involves highly
complex processes. Different interpretations led to inconsistent appli-
cations by field personnel for the respective federal agencies with
wetland responsibilities: the Corps, EPA, Fish & Wildlife Service, and
the Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service. The Fish
& Wildlife Service applied a significantly different basis for wetland
juri..liction than the other 'agencies; its 1979 manual required only one
(;f the three wetlan4 criteria."' This inconsistency severely impeded
eflorts to regulate wetlands uniformly"' and, predictably, heightened
tensions between competing inter-st groups. After fifteen years of
continuing conflict and uncertainty, the regulated community mar-
shalled its resources in an effort to revitalize wetland regulation. As
Section B explains below, the resulting proposal for resolving regulatory
conflicts merely highlighted a fundamental difference of perspective
concerning the proper scope of wetland regulation.
E. Going Beyond the No Net Loss Policy
Current elements of the ongoing regulator) controversy are traceable
to the aftermath of a compromise that, ironically, appeared to unify
previously irreconcilable wetland perspectives. In 1987, a prestigious
group of state governors, business and environmental leaders, acade-
micians and developers came together at the National Wetlands Policy
Id. at 1. The term "hydric soil" refers to soil that is "floodcd, ponded. and/or
saturatrd long enough during the growing season to produce anaerobic conditions in
the upper part" of the soil profilt. Id. at 5. The term "hydrology" refers to "[alreas
that are inundated or have saturated soils for at least a week during the growing
season more often than every other year on the average." Id. at 7. Set also Dickerson,
wupra note 57. at 1482-83.
- Sands, supra note 83. at I. See also Dickerson, supra note 55, at 1482-83 (citing
FisI An WIDI.FtE SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FWS/OBS-79/31, CLAsst-
FIATION OF WLTINDS AND DEEPWATER HABITATS OF THE UNITED STATES (1979)). The
Fish & Wildlif-: Service's 1979 Delineation Manual simply requires one of the three
Sritria-periodic wetland vegetation, predominantly hydric soil, or saturatian-at
%eme time during the growing season. Sands, rtpra note 83, at 3.
' Dickerson, supra note 55. at 1483.
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Forum to recommend a consensus strategy for protecting the nation's
wetlands. 87
In 1988, President George Bush elevated the importance of wetlands
protection by adopting the Forum's fundamental goal, no net loss of
wetlands. The optimism surrounding the no net loss policy soon
dissipated, however. The fragile consensus was torn apart by the
following developments: prnmulgation of a revised wetland delineation
manual," EPA's veto of a permit for the popular Two Forks Dam
public works project,8 and mounting controversy over the proper role
of mitigation within the permit process. 90 This part of the article
demonstrates how the underlying conflict enshrined in section 404 led
to a deterioration of the no net loss consensus. Finally, subpart B closes
with the observation that unaccountable agency action concerning
regulatory policy, whether due to executive influence or overzealous
implementation by the Corps or the EPA, is an abuse of basic
democratic principles.
1. Conflicting interpretations of "no net loss"
The conflict between economic and ecological interests under section
404 flared once again shortly after the 1987 National Wetland Forum's
vague no net loss compromise. Rather than interpreting no net loss as
a flexible long term goal,"' environmentalists pushed for pure protection
of wetlands. They urged literal, immediate, and comprehensive appli-
cation of the CWA to prevent the loss of any wetlands. Landowners
" TIHE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION
A;F..DrA. TilHE FINAl. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM Ihercinafter
:oR.%t REPoRTI; Lovely, supra note 24. at 648 n.7.
- See discussion infra at subpart 1l.B.2.a.
- Section 404 Program Critics Call for Reform, LAND LETTER (Wj. Chandler & Assoc
Ihercinafter Chandlerl, Mar. 1, 1991, at 1.
See discussion infra at subpart l11.B.2.b.
Long-term goals in certain statutes indicate Congress' desire for a flexible
approach to pressing environmental problems where carefully-tailored solutions are
currently unavailable, or unwise. The MMPA expresses a long term goal of "insig-
nificant dolphin mortality rates approaching zero" for fishing activities involving the
setting of piirse-seinc nets to catch yellowfin tuna (the nets arc intentionally set on
dolphins, which are often found swimming above schools of yellow-fin tuna). Marine
M-.mmal Prot'ction Act (MMPA). 16 U.S.C. S 1372 (1991). Similarly, the CWA
establiuhcs an unachievable, industry-forcing "goal" of eliminating pollutant discharge
by 1985. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1251(a)(1) (1991).
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and developers, on the other hand, sought balanced consideration of
both economic and ecological factors in section 404 permit decisions. 92
2. Agency cooperation fails to resolve the conflict
The four principal federal agencies with wetlands responsibilities (the
Corps, the EPA, the Fish & Wildlife Service, and the Department of
Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service) appeared to reach a consensus
on these issues in 1989. Conflicts along the way, however, soon revealed
that the debate over wetland regulation was far from settled. The
environmental community complained that the agencies' efforts were
falling short, and the business community countered that the agencies'
agreement represented "a drastic change from the past." 93
(a) The 1989 federal delineation manual.
Complaints about inconsistent application of wetland identification"
techniques" prompted cooperative agency efforts to produce a joint
delineation manual. In January 1989, the four agencies agreed to use
the same mandatory definition for identifying wetlands. 95 The agencies
implemented this new manual without providing for public review and
comment, claiming that "the agreement does not change the way
wetlands are defined. ' 9
6
"1 The Endangered Species Act calls for consideration of both the economic impact
caused by proposed critical habitat designation, 16 U.S.C. S 1533(b)(2), and the
benefits provided by alternatives consistent with the statutory goals, Id. S 1536(h)(J)(A)
(1991). The Fishery Conservation and Management Act promotes fisheries utilization
that provides the greatest overall bcn',it to the nation, while taking into account and
allowing for regional variations in the resource. 16 U.S.C. SS 1801-1882 (1991).
" Marianne Lavclle, Wetlands: the new battle e(y in Washington, NAT'L L. J.. July 23,
1990, at 24.
"' Dickerson, supra note 57. at 1483-84.
See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGE.vcy, U.S. FIsH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S.D.A. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE,
FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AN) DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL. WETLANDS (1988)
[hereinafter FEDERAL DELINEATION MANUAL). The FEDERAl. DELINEATION MANUAL was
not formally adopted until 1989. The predecessors of the FEDERAL DELINEATION MANUAL
arc discussed supra in subpart lII.A.5. See also MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETwEEN
THE ARMY AND EPA CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF THFGEOGRAPHIC JURISDICTION
OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM (Jan. 19, 1989).
"1 Chandler. tupra note 89. at I.
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Journalists reported that "[in 1988 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS) estimated 100 million acres of wetlands in the
continental United States; in 1990, after adoption .of the manual, it
produced virtually the same estimate." 97 Although technically correct,
these reports failed to point out that the USFWS's interpretation did
not concur with generally recognized assessments of wetland acreage
under the Corps/EPA 1987 Delineation Manual. Misleading and in-
flammatory statements like this failed to consider the dramatic changes
made by the new manual. For example,
the approximately 7,000 vegetation species used as wetlands indicators
also occur with some frequency in non-wetland areas, . . . Ithc 1989
manual] creates thirteen special conditions under which land may be
deemed wetland by satisfying only one or two of the three required technical
criteria, . . . fand the 1989 manual] is replete with technicalflaws including
the failure to recognize significant regional differences in vegetation and soil
across the country.98
(b) The Corps-EPA memorandum of agreement on wetlands mitigation.
Another document illustrating the agencies' efforts to cooperate is
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Wetlands Mitigation be-
tween the Corps and the EPA. Prior to this arrangement, the Corps
and the EPA disagreed about the validity of mitigation as a consider-
ation during section 404 permitting decisions. In Bersani v. Robichaud,"9
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address or even
acknowledge EPA's general policy that mitigation i's not an appropriate
means of satisfying the section 404(b)(1) guidelines. The court's hold-
ing, however, appeared to favor the EPA's interpretation. 1°
Subsequent consultations between the two agencies led to a revised
MOA on Wetlands Mitigation incorporating the EPA's sequencing
" Tim Searchinger and Douglas Rader, The Condominium Crowd Makes its Move on
Wetlands, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 21, 1991, at 6. The 1989 Manual apparently incor-
porated FWS's perspective of wetland indicators. See supra subpart III.A.5.
Dickerson, supin note 57, at 1484 (emphasis added).
850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
,o, Id. at 46; see also Houck, supra note 6, at 10,212 (noting that with time, Bersani
"might have caused the Corps to cease mitigation-based permitting," however, de-
velopments in the Wetlands Forum "subsumed the issue").
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approach."dt The agencies also committed themselves to no net loss by
requiring tha, "[wetlands] mitigation should provide, at a minimum,
one for one functional replacement (i.e., no net loss of values)."' 2
Although the MOA was originally issued on November 15, 1989, the
White House delayed actual implementation of the agreement several
times in order to respond to criticisms submitted by the Departments
of Energy and Transportation, the oil and gas industry, and Alaskan
development interests.10 3 As a result, the revised MOA on Wetlands
Mitigation allows the Corps to deviate from the otherwise required
sequencing approach whenever EPA agrees that a proposed discharge
into wetlands is "necessary to avoid environmental harm," will produce
"environmental gain or insignificant environmental losses," or when-
ever the "mitigation measures necessary to meet this goal are ntt
feasible, not practicable" or inconsequential."' 4 Reactions to these MOA
amendments epitomize the divergence of views concerning section 40-4
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT wE'wEEN rieENVIRONMENTAl. PRor:iltv, A(,F%(.-W
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TItE ARMY CONCERNING THE DETERMINA1tIoN OF I'; Iit'
UNDER TilE CI.EAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(a)(1) GUIDELINES (Feb b. 1l) [h,,i-in
after N|OA oN WETLANDS MITIGATION], at 2. 3. The EPA considers wlwsli-i .,
discharge should he permitted by applying a sequential procedure (avoidan.. 111111
gation. and compensation), granting a permit only where the agency determines" fir%t.
that potential wetland impacts have been avoided to the maximum extent pra(titable.
second, that remaining unavoidable impacts will be mitigated to the extent appropriate
and practicable: and finally, that the permit applicant will compensate for aqutit
resource values lost or damaged. I. at 3; see also 40 C.F.R. S 230.10 (1992) (codifymink
the EPA's sequencing approach).
"It is important to recognize that there are circumstances where the impacts of a
project are so ignificant that even if alternatives are not available, the discharge may
not be permtttedl regardless of the compensatory mitigation proposed." MOA os
VET.ANDS MtTIGATION. Supra, at 3 n.5 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c)).
,' Id. at 5. In other words, the MOA defines "no net loss" as meaning that any
loss of wetlands must be replaced, either through creation, restoration or modification,
with wetlands of at least functionally equivalent value. See also William L. Want. The
Army-EPA Agreem-nt on Wetlands Afitigation, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,209, 10.210 (June
1990).
Want, supra note 102, at 10.210-11; Royal C. Gardner, The Army-EPA Mitigation
Agreement: No Retreat From Wetlands Protection, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10.337. 10.337 nn
1-5 (Aug. 1990).
'" MOA o.N WETLANDS MtTIGAT1ON. supra note 101, at 2. 3; Want, supra note 102,
at 10.210 (noting also that the MOA recognizes that no net loss of wetlands functions
and values "may not be achieved in each and every permit action"); Gardner. supra
note 103. at 10,341.
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that continues to polarize conservationists and developers." °5 Although
the revised MOA may solve some of the problems associated with"
section 404, it "does not represent the FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING
[of wetlands regulation] that is necessary."'10
3. The continuing ambiguity of congressional guidance
Congress is fully aware of the public uncertainty concerning the
relationsi'ip between economic and environmental factors under section
404. It is also clear that section 404 does not provide comprehensive
protection of the nation's wetlands. Our elected representatives con-
tinue, however, to address wetlands loss in a piecemeal, inconsistent
fashion.7
During the 102nd Congress, staff members of the Senate Environ-
ment & Public Works Committee suggested that the Committee would
not include any significant changes to the section 404 program in its
1992 reauthorization bill.'8 The National Wetlands Coalition and other
,'o See id. at 10,211; Ronald A. Zumbrun, Wetland Preservation Rule Adopted Without
Public Comment, L.A. DAILY J., May 1, 1991, at 6; Houck, supra note 6. at 10,214.
"O Dickerson, supra note 57, at 1488 (emphasis added). A uniform wetland evaluation
technique would represent a significant step toward improved regulation of wetland
areas.
", See, e.g., the Conservation Easements on Wetlands in FmHA Inventory Property
Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. S 1985(g) (1991); the Farms for the Future Act of 1990, 7
U.S.C. S 4201 (note) (1991); the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended
1965, 16 U.S.C. S 662 (1991); the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, as amended
1966, 16 U.S.C. S 715k (1991); the Wetlands Loan Act, as amended 1988, 16 U.S.C.
S 715k-3 (1991); the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, as amended
1990, 16 U.S.C. 5S 1001-09 (1991); the Water Bank Program (WBP), as amended
1980, 16 U.S.C. SS 1301-11 (1991); the Erodible Lands and Wetland Conservation
and Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. S5 3801-39d (1991); the Emergency Wetland
Resources Act, as amended 1989, 16 U.S.C. S5 3901-32 (1991); the Coastal Wetlands
Planning, Protection and Restoration Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. S 3951-56 (1991): the
North American Wetlands Conservation Act of 1989, 16 U.S.C. 55 4401-13 (1991):
(the Land and Water Conservation Fund), 16 U.S.C. SS 4601 through 4601-22 (1991):
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1413
(1991).
" Chandler, supra note 89, at 6. See also The Status of Wetlands Science: hearing before
the Subcommittee on Environmental Protection of the Commitee on Environment & Public Works.
S. Hrg. No. 102-69, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (statement by Senator Max Baucus
of Montana), 24 (statement by Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island) (April 9. 1991):
r[iplementation of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: hearing before the Subcommittee on
Environmental Protection of the Committee on Environment & Public Works. S. Hrg. No. 102-
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interested parties then lobbied members of Congress who were not on
the committee. Their vigorous efforts resulted in the introduction of
several bills aiming to reform wetlands regulation.1 9
4. Displacing agency decisionmaking responsibility
A growing tide of economic conservatism"0 appeared to convince
President George Bush to take preemptive action despite the introduc-
tion of these bills. On August 9, 1991, the Bush Administration
unveiled a new plan for protecting the nation's wetlands."' The effort
suggested a return to the vindication of private property rights, pre-
viously initiated in 1981 through a Regulatory Reform Task Force led
by then-Vice President George Bush." ' 2 President Bush's Wetlands
Protection Plan apparently sought to rein in section 404 by injecting
more balance into the permitting process."3 The potential impact of
this plan recognizably diminished with the departure of President Bush
and the election of Bill Clinton. Without more explicit congressional
guidance, however, section 404's fundamental inconsistencies, conflicts
between environmentalists and developers, and further wetland losses,
450, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. 172 (letter from the National Governor's Association
urging no changes to section 404 until amendments to the 1989 delineation manual
have been given an opportunity to improve the program) (June 20, July 10, and Nov.
22, 1991).
" H.R. 1330, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep. Jimmy Hayes, D-La.);
S. 1463, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Sen. John Breaux, D-La.). Other bills
introduced that same session also sought to revise § 404, including: H.R. 251, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep. Charles Bennett, D-Fla.); H.R. 404, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep. John Hammerschmidt, R-Ark.); and H.R. 2400,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep. Lindsay Thomas, D-Ga.). No substantive
action was taken on any of these bills.
"" See, e.g , Michael Satchel[, Any Color But Green, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 21. 1991, at 74 (reporting that the "wise use" coalition blames poor economic
conditions on environmental statutes, which do not sufficiently balance nonenviron-
mental interests).
:i See generally President Bush's Wetlands Plan, supra note 48.
" See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,466 (1983) (implementing a policy
based on the belief that American businesses are too heavily regulated by the federal
government).
"' The President's Plan was apparently prepared to resolve a controversy between
regulatory amendments proposed by the Competitiveness Council. See generally supra
part 1, and note 15. See also infra subpart III.B.4.b (discussing the scientific recom-
mendations of the Federal Interagency Committee for Wetland Delineation).
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are likely to persist." 4 A quick evaluation of President Bush's Wetlands
Plan provides a sense of the business community's interests concerning
wetland regulation and reveals several problems associated with un-
checked executive oversight.
(a) Streamlining & flexibility.
President Bush's plan attempted to streamline section 404 procedures
and introduce greater flexibility in analyzing proposed developments.
The President sought to replace consulting agency appeals of individual
permits granted by the Corps with appeals based on resources or issues
of national significance." 5 The President's interpretation of section 404
under the plan placed increased emphasis on balancing economic and
ecological interests. " 6 In addition, the plan provided incentives for
private restoration or creation of wetlands, including a system of
granting mitigation-banking credits where the effects of proposed de-
velopments in wetlands areas are mitigated through off-site enhance-
ment projects." 7
(b) The 1991 federal delineation manual.
The President's plan also sought to revise the Federal Delineation
Manual. Pursuant to the Bush Administration's wishes, the EPA
promulgated proposed revisions to the Federal Delineation Manual for
public comment on August 14, 1991. . 8 One of the criteria for delin-
eation, wetlands hydrology, requires inundation for fifteen or more
consecutive days, or saturation for twenty-one or more consecutive
days." As a result, some areas designated as wetlands under the 1989
delineation manual were not wetlands under the revised manual.'-1 ' The
'" Houck, supra note 6, at 10,212 no. 8-13. Houck commented that "[tlhe actors
inJ alliances may change ... but the basic positions remain the same-intractable-
and proceeding from entirely different assumptions." Id, at 10,212.
See President Bush's Wetlands Plan, supra note 48, at 4.
Id. at 4-5. The President's plan resurrected the Corps' balancing test. w.hich wts
implicitly rejected by Bersani in favor of the EPA's sequencing approach. See supra part
1II.A 5 (discussing the respective tests).
See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A N'ew Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1991).
56 Fed. Reg. 40,446-40,480 (August 14. 1991).
I' d.
Robert T. Stewart and Chris M. Amantea. President's New Policy Shifts Focus.
NAT'L L. J., Feb 10, 1992, at 27. Only areas experiencing seven days of saturation
within eighteen inches of the ground surface are designated as wetlands. Id
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agencies continued to assert, however, tha-t they did not change thlir
wetland definitions.' 21
Executive attention can, and sometimes does, contribute to the
development of sound national policy. Where this oversight displaces
agency decisionmaking authority, however, executive influence risks
conflict with the president's constitutional responsibility to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed.1 2' A collision between conservation
and business interests apparently led to political tradeoffs and subse-
quent changes in wetland delineation rules.'"" Soon after this collision,
several scientists quit the Federal Interagency Committee lbr Wetland
Delineation in a dramatic protest of undue administrative influence.'
The "infusion of politics into what was initially designed as a tehitmcal
exercise'"'12 prompted the following individuals to make statements
critical of the Bush Administration: William Sipple, Chief Ecologist
EPA Office of Wetlands, stated that he would have engaged in "uneth-
ical behavior" by agreeing to the proposed changes without first getting
public comment; EPA ecologist Charles Rhodes, Jr., complained ol
"external pressures" and the redrafting of technical provisions b%
"'others with limited wetlands experience"; and finally, Acting FXVS
Director Bruce Blanchard sent a letter to EPA refusing to accept its
fourteen-day inundation threshold because it was "confusing and itela-
nically indefensible. 'I -2 t
Whether or not the compromises implemented by the Competitisc-
ness Council would have actually improved the status quo, democratic
principles require adherence to the statutory mandate provided under
section 404 of the CWA. Typically, Congress intends agencies to apply
Id at 36 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 65,963 (Dec. 19. 1991). which seeks to portra,
dic proposed addition of a new wetlands regulatory section as a simple descriptic n ol
new identifying characteristics for wetlands).
See Gilhooley, supra note 42. at 311.
Michael Weisskopf, Rewriting the Book on Wetlands: Scientists It'ajh lland / I',tta,
flousC's Definition of Protected Areas, WASHINGTON' POST, May 3. 1991. ,. A23. Kitlh
Schneider. 3 U.S Agencies Want to Loosen Weland Curbs: Draft Proposal Rrrealt Rit ;,.
Government. NEW YORI Ttics. May 15. 1991. at A18. See also Gilh'olky. ntma nzt
t2. at 311-13 nn. 76-90 (discussing Gilhoolcy's view that the executive oversight
proess permits manipulation of agency analysis to it a predetermined outcolle)
", Weisskopf. supra note 123 (indicating that these scientists quit after politital
(onsiderations reflecting the interests of the business and development communiiN
o<errodc their scientific recommendations).
Id (emphasis added).Id
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their expertise rather than simply respond to political choices. When
the President's advisors became deadlocked over the "extent of pro-
tection to be conferred on the nation's dwindling wetlands," however,
they chose to pull the President into the politically sticky issue rather
than rely on technical expertise. 27 Even if a plan like President Bush's
were viable, that fact wo.:ld not justify immunity from effective judicial
review.
IV. A NEW JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEFERENCE
With a firm grasp of the regulatory evolution of wetlands protection
under section 404 well in hand, it is now appropriate to return to this
article's primary concern: the influence of executive oversight on the
rulemaking process. Professor Thomas Merrill theorizes that Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council'28 has not had the
revolutionary impact on judicial review that many commentators as-
sume.' 2 9 Cases applying Chevron "have on the whole produced fewer
affirmances" than those that do not follow Chevron."0 Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court itself often ignores Chevron in cases
involving deference questions."' The Court's apparent reluctance to
"' Michael Weisskopf, Bush: Arbiter on Wetlands Dispute?. WASHINGTON POST. July
30, 1991, at A13. Weisskopf reported unidentified sources as stating that President
gush was to receive an options paper "asking him to sort out technical matters
normally left to his advisers, such as the number of days a parcel of land must be
inundated to qualify as a wetland.- Id. According to Weisskopf. -'EPA Administrator
Reilly was outnumbered [at a meeting of the Council on Competitiveness] by officials
seeking to weaken wetlands safeguards beyond what he haldl proposed." Id.
'-' 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
' Merrill, supra note 27. at 970. Contra Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot. 7o
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal :ldministratire Law. 1990 DuxE L.J. 984.
'" Merrill, supra note 27, at 984.
"' See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Curtin Mathcson Scientific, Inc..
494 U.S. 775 (1990)(holding that a NLRB rule is entitled to considerable deference
so long as it is rational and consistent with the organic statute, even where the rule
represents a departure from the Board's prior policy): Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (holding that a decision by the Corps to issue
a Supplemental Information Report. rather than a second supplemental EIS, in order
to review new information affecting a dam project, is entitled to deference provided
the agency has made a reasoned decision based on its analysis of those documents):
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office Prods. Co.. 486
U.S. 107 (1988) (holding that EEOC's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act, as
permitting immediate EEOC jurisdiction over Civil Rights Act violations prior to
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apply Chevron is probably linked to that case's apparent all-or-nothing
approach. If congressional limits are discernible, the Court exercises
purely independent judgment with no consideration of the executive
viewpoint; otherwise, the Court gives maximum deference to the
executive branch.'3 2
Indiscriminate application of Chevron can be said to reflect the
continuing rivalry between mandatory and discretionary deference mod-
els in the judicial branch.13 As with many aspects of public policy,
truth, justice, and equity probably lie somewhere in the middle of
these two extremes. Professor Merrill suggests a potentially viable
solution that assimilates the judicial deference doctrine into the general
juridical practice of following precedent. 34 Under Merrill's executive
precedent model, the courts are asked to follow precedent generated
by a different branch of government.'"3 The courts' decision to defer
would "entail a three-part inquiry: (1) Is there an executive precedent?
(2) How strong is that precedent? (3) Given the strength of the
precedent, does an independent judicial examination of statutory in-
terpretation compel a different result? ' "1 6 Under this model, the courts
would affirm agency decisions that present a combination of strong
precedent and congruence with congressional intent, and reject those
that present a combination of weak precedent and tension with con-
gressional intent .'3
Professor Merrill's model makes sense because executive interpreta-
tions of law are analogous to decisions by courts of coordinate juris-
diction. 138 Executive interpretations "share much in common with
judicial precedent."'3 9 For example, strengths and weaknesses exist on
expiration of the statutorily required 60 days after termination of State agency
proceedings, is entitled to deference where reasonable). There are numerous other
cases involving deference questions where the Court has apparently ignored Chevron.
See Merrill, supra note 27, at 982 and Appendix.
, Merrill, supra note 27, at 977.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1003-31.
Id. at 1003-12.
" Id. at 1010.
'" Id. at 1014. Application of this model to recent wetland proposals or to the
earlier stages of S 404 implementation is a useful exercise, but is beyond the scope of
this comment.
I Id. at 1004.
83- Id.
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both sides of the ledger when comparing courts and agencies. The
characteristics of technical expertise, familiarity, and accountability, for
example, favor the agencies. The courts, on the other hand, benefit
from legal expertise, freedom from time constraints, and insulation
from political pressure. Professor Merrill's executive precedent model
encourages deference to the judgments of more accountable political
actors, but avoids the practical and theoretical failings caused by
Chevron's all-or-nothing approach. 40 Whereas the Court's current prac-
tice of tempering Chevron with ad hoc exceptions lacks internal coher-
ence,' 4 1 the executive precedent model "strikes a more enduring balance
between executive, legislative, and judicial perspectives, and between
the forces of change and stability.' '4 2
Many features of the discretionary deference doctrine, which were
apparently banished under Chevron, "suddenly become explicable once
we view the practice of deference as a form of following precedent."'4 3
Under the executive precedent model, the discretionary deference doc-
trine's traditional contextual factors- express delegations, agency ex-
pertise, longstanding interpretations, well-reasoned decisions, the
existence or lack of interagency agreement, contemporaneous interpre-
tations, congressionally-ratified interpretations, the level of statutory
ambiguity and independent judicial judgment-are all weighed against
each other on a sliding scale.'"4 Although Professor Merrill's suggested
model "may be-complex . . . . it is not unprincipled."'4H The model
encourages the courts to provide more revealing, candid reasons for
either deferring to or invalidating agency decisions. 14 According to
Professor Merrill,
there are too many different types of circumstances, including different
statutes, different kinds of application, different substantive regulatory
or administrative problems, and different legal postures in which cases
arrive, to allow 'proper' judicial attitudes about questions of law to be
reduced to any single simple verbal formula.'4
See id. at 1013-15. See also supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
Merrill, supra note 27, at 1027.
I d. at 1028.
"I Id. at 1016-22.
I' d.
" d. at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
Id. (citing Stephen BreyerJudicial Review of Questions of Law and Pohcy, 38 Aoit x.
L. REv. 363, 373 (1989) (criticizing mandatory judicial deference as an improper
standard of review)).
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V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE WETLANDS PROTECTION
CHALLENGE
Legislative action may be more effective than the judicial reform
proposed by Professor Merrill, supra part IV, especially given the
continuing threat to wetlands posed by concern over American com-
petitiveness and economic growth. The length of time and cost involved
in mounting effective legal challenges, not to mention the politically
charged atmosphere, also support congressional action in favor of
judicial reform. If development interests ultimately persuade Congress
to incorporate more balance into section 404, the legislative branch
could adopt or acquiesce in modifications such as those included in
former Presidenrt Bush's Wetlands Plan."" Until that time, however,
any effort to limit the protection of wetlands under section 404 will
necessarily conflict with long-standing interpretations of the CWA.1"9
A. Disclosure of Regulatory Review Impacts
The infusion of politics into the regulatory review process through
executive oversight arguably displaces an agency's obligation to make
independent regulatory decisions based on its experience and expertise.
The veil protecting the processes of executive oversight could, however,
deflect even a "hard look"'1' by the courts into the legitimacy of such
action. This problem can be addressed by requiring the disclosure of
- Senators John Chafee (R-RI) and Max Baucus (D-MT) cautioned FWS Director
John Turner that "revisions to the manual should not be used to effect policy changes"
in $ 404, and that if "you believe that changes are needed, we ask that you submit
such recommendations to the Congress for its consideration." Letter from Chafee and
Baucus to Turner, cited in Johnson, Administration attemrpts to bend wetlands science, THE
LEADER, June 1991, at 1.
"1 See supra notes 24 and 46 for a discussion of greater congressional concern for
environmental protection under the Clean Water Act, as compared to other environ-
mental statutes. But see supra notes 49, 54-55 and accompanying text for an argument
to the contrary. Suggesting, respectively, that Congress implicitly acknowledged some
wetland resources arc not subject to regulation, or that the legislative branch cannot
rely on its consitutional power under the commerce clause to extend regulatory
jurisdiction over all wetland resources. Id.
'" In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983), the United States Supreme Court applied a "hard look" standard
to reject, as arbitary and capricious, a decision by the Secretary of Transportation
rescinding passive automobile restraint regulations because the decision was not sup-
ported by a reasoned analysis.
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administrative policy as it affects agency decisionmaking. "' This pro-
posal will not reveal the give-and-take of executive and agency com-
munications in reaching a decision. Instead,
agencies would designate, as both an administration and agency position,
any policy adopted to reflect specific oral or written comments of OMB
Ithe Office of Management and Budget] or the White House made
during the regulatory review process ... the agency would also identify
its initial position as a policy alternative it considered and provide reasons for
adopting a different position.""
For example, under this proposal the regulatory record for the 1991
Federal Delineation Manual would have to include EPA's earlier
proposal for broader wetland protection as a rejected alternative."' The
agency would also have to explain why a more limited definition was
adopted instead of its earlier proposal. According to Environmental
Defense Fund biologist Douglas Rader, the fifteen and twenty-one day
definitions proposed in former President Bush's now-abandoned Plan
"were pulled out of the air," and have "no bearing on ecological
reality.' 4
Disclosure is not aimed at insulating agencies from politically re-
sponsive influence. It is meant, rather, to reinforce the agencies'
ultimate responsibility to ensure that adoption of an adminisiration
position is consistent with the agency's statutory mission.' ' Disclosure
See generally Gilhooley, supra note 42. at 320-21. See also id. at 307 nn. 48-55. 335
nn. 189-92 (criticizing thr laik of documentation in the public record concerning the
Competitiveness Council's role in the alteration of a proposed EPA rule). Legislation
to require disclosure of extra-agency influence was introduced during the 2nd Session
of the 102nd Congress. See S. 1942, 137 Co.-e. REC. S16.250 (Nov. 7, 1991) (the
Regulatory Review Sunshine Act). For earlier examples, see 128 Co. ,. Ric. 5285-
305 (1982) (S. 1080, the Regulatory Reform Act of 1982) and 132 Cot.e• R-c. 572.
574 (1986) (S. 2023 proposing establishment of a public file disclosing any intervention
by the Office of Management and Budget into the rule-making process). The latter
example is also discussed at 128 CoNe,. REc. 25,662-63 (1982) and in Oversight oj OMB
Regulatory Review and Planning Ptocess: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Intereovernmental
Relations of the Senate Comm. on Govt'l Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess 56. 98 (1986).
" Gilhooley, supra note 42, at 301-02 (emphasis added).
' See supra part 1ll.B.4 for discussion of the executive oversight process, and the
intervention of President Bush, as displacing the EPA's statutorily-mandated decision-
making authority.
' ' Stenger, supra note 22, at 12-14.
' Gilhooley, supra note 42, at 303.
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will provide greater accountability in the regulatory process, and give
courts the information they need to accurately assess compliance with
congressional mandates.'s Professor Margaret Gilhooley, of Seton Hall
Law School, confidently dismisses concern that this disclosure require-
ment may represent an inappropriate intrusion into the deliberative
process.'' Although "(t]he administration has a recognized role in
influencing agency decisions," its influence "cannot exceed the statu-
torily delegated responsibility of the agency."'5 8
B. Explicit Section 404 Policy Guidance from Congress
When first enacted, the CWA provided a "new shape for adminis-
trative process-one that would avoid the use of expertise as an excuse
to inaction and would protect agencies from capture by special inter-
csts."" 9 The initial evolution of section 404 under CWA's broader
policies'" generally conformed to this procedural design, but develop-
ments in recent years suggest that additional legislative guidance is
now required.
In his examination of comparable Clean Air Act (CAA)' " develop-
ments, Bruce Ackerman, Professor of Law at Yale University, notes
that EPA's failure to make sensible regulatory policy was a symptom
of organizational breakdown under the Act.' 62 This failure was caused
in part by vague formulas for environmental protection that too readily
delegated basic value choices to agency exprts. Although Congress
11 Id. at nn. 19-20 and acccmpanying text (citing Vcrkuil, Wieltome to the Constantly
Evolving Field of Administrative Law. 42 AD?.NIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990)).
"' Gilhooley, supra note 42. at 350. See also id. at 335-48 nn. 193-244 (noting that
such intrusions are otherwise prohibited by executive privilcgc).
'" Id. at 350. See atso Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. "lAin agency to which Congrrss
has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that deeation.
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments" provided that accountability to the people is preserved. Id. (emphasis
added).
I" BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
at I (discussing general characteristics of tLe evolving administrative process in the
context of the Clean Air Act).
' See supra subparts III.A.I through 5.
42 U.S.C. S$ 7401- 7671q (1992).
I: ACKERMAN, supra note 159, at 2, 124.
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accorded high. priority to scrubbing technology, 16 the agencies could
have selected other more ecologically sensible and less costly mechan-
.isms for combatting air pollution instead. 61 In effect, an extraneous
interest in applying uniform standards rather than accounting for
regional differences subverted the CAA's goal of reducing total air
pollution.'65 If Congress had given more explicit guidance on economic
and environmental values, this result might have been avoided.
Professor Ackerman advises that "it is imperative . . . that [Con-
gress'] early efforts in agency-forcing be replaced by statutory schemes
that promise a more fruitful dialogue between politicians and techno-
crats in the decade[s] ahead."''  Admittedly, the political compromises
that weakened the CAA arc different from the proposals for limiting
federal wetlands jurisdiction: "[uInlike many other environmental laws
that require a facility or project to attain a certain level of pollution
control, wetlands regulation simply determines whether the project will
be built in the first place."' '6 Persons interested in convincing Congress
to reform section 404 of the CWA can rely upon the lessons provided
by Professor Ackerman. Although the CWA represents an initially
successful utilization of agency-forcing provisions, breakdowns in coin-
munication between politicians and agency scientists threaten to exac-
erbate the statutory conflict between economic and environmental
concerns.
Congressional statements of purpose and explicit statutory goals will
not necessarily provide precise solutions, but could help the experts
resolve internal conflicts."' The pursuit of congressionally-formuiated
A technique called "'flue gas desulfurization'" that reduces the amount of sulfur
dioxide particles rel-.,ed into the air as a by-product of industrial production; the
process involves a device attached to smokestacks which evokes a chemical reaclion
attracting sulfur dioxide into a lime solution that is sprayed in the path of elauast
gases-which is later removed, dewatercd and extruded in the form of sludgr.
Ackerman, supra note 159. -at 15-16.
" See generally Dale W. Jorgensen & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Environmental Reulation and
Economic Growth. 21 RAN DJ. Ecoa., 314 (1990).
' ACKERMA,,, supra note 159, at 45-47; see also Bruce A. Ackerman and William
T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 Yale L. J. 1466. 1492-
96 (1980) [hereinafter Beyond the New Deal].
'" Ackerman. supra note 159. at 4 (emphasis added); see also Beyond the Neu Deal,
supra note 164, at 1470.
"" William L. Want, Expanding Wetlands Jurisdiction Afjeces Property Transactiont. NAT't.
L. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 19. See also supra note 149.
,a See, e.g.. Grumbles & Kopocis, supra note 64; John Webster Kilborn, Purchaser
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wetland protection policy takes the lessons of the CAA to heart and
applies them to the CWA. To paraphrase Professor Ackerman, Con-
gress must be careful not to mix clean water symbols with the economic
self-interest of landowners in a way that invites cynicism about self
governnient. 169 Acquiescence to wetlands regulatory changes like those
proposed by former President Bush, a plan that might resurface in
subsequent political debates, is tantamount to acting against Professor
Ackerman's advice. Whether Congress wishes to clarify its original
intention by (a) requiring balanced consideration of economic and
environmental interests under the Clean Water Act or (b) expressly
prohibiting the agencies from making such comparisons, our elected
representatives should take affirmative action. The policy implications
inherent in such a choice should be debated and resolved on the floors
of the U.S. House of Represenatives and the U.S. Senate, not behind
the closed doors of an executive oversight committee meeting, especially
if dramatic changes of policy will receive a mere rubber-stamp of
approval from the judiciary.
VI. CONCLUSION
Divergent interpretations of the phrase "no net loss" (a long term
goal in the minds of developers; a more immediate mandate for
conservationists) reflect the basic policy conflict inherent in section 404
of the Clean Water Act. Advocates for the retrenchment of existing
wetland protection policies have legitimate concerns; their focus on the
impacts of environmental statutes on local and national economies
understandably promotes grass-roots and institutional support for reg-
ulatory reform. Environmental regulations have had an undeniable
impact on local economic development efforts.7 0 Whether or not the
current regulatory regime adequately balances economic development
with environmental protection is, therefore, a worthwhile topic for
debate. The concerns motivati -g passage of the Clean Water Act in
the first place, however, have not dissipated. In fact, improved under-
Liability for the Restoration of Illegally Filled Wetlands under Section 404 of the Ciean Water
Act. 18 E.vT'L AFF. 319 (1991); William K. McGrccvey, Note. A Public Availabiliy
Approach to Section 404(bX)) Alternatives Analysis: A Practical Definition for Practicable
Alternatives. 59 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 379 (1991).
"61 See ACKER.,AN, supra note 159, at 116 (referring to clean air symbols): see also
Beyond the Neu, Deal. supra note 164, at 1566.
See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 15:23
standing of the impacts of human activity on the environment, and
continuing losses of vital resources, counsel against retrenchment of
existing statutory environmental protections. In either case, we must
resolve the apparent tension between these interests in order to ensure
the rational conservation and management of national and local wet-
lands. Any changes to the process should, however, take place in a
way that respects democratic principles of accountability.
Expanded executive oversight and broadened judicial deference en-
abled President Bush's administration to attack longstanding statutory
interpretations of the CWA regarding environmental protection.'" Al-
though President Clinton eliminated the Competitiveness Council,17 2
these twin forces of change could resurface. Agency supervision is one
of the president's constitutionally-approved executive functions, but
agencies also have a legal responsibility to exercise independent judg-
ment. Broad, deferential judicial review of executive influence, under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1 3 deprives the
public of an essential tool for checking alleged excesses in the executive
branch. 74 As discussed in Section IV above, the courts should be ready
to undertake meaningful judicial review of executive influence, espe-
cially where regulatory changes merely reflect responses to political
pressure. The public interest is best served when democratic principles
of accountability are upheld.
Professor Merrill's executive precedent model encourages judicial
deference based on traditional contextual factors.'17 Agency expertise,
longstanding statutory interpretations, well-reasoned decisions, the ex-
' Compare supra notes 24 (discussing present judicial interpretations of the CWA as
favoring environmental protection) and 46 (regarding the distinction between Congress'
ambiguous, compromise bifurcation of § 404 administrative authority under the EPA
and the Corps, and other environmental statutes) with supro notes 45 (cataloging
statutorily authorized cost-benefit analysis policies under the Federal Insecticide. Fun-
gicide and Rodenticide Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act), 91 (noting flexible long term approaches to the
resolution of environment-development problems under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) and 92 (listing statutorily
authorized balancing of environmental and economic factors under the Endangered
Species Act and the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act).
'' See supra note 17.
"' 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see supra part II for discussion on the potential application
of this case in a challenge to changes in the wetland regulatory scheme.
" The Council on Competitiveness also influenced the development of clean air.
recycling and hazardous waste policy. Stenger. supra note 22, at 13.
" See supra text accompanying note 144.
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istence or lack of interagency agreement, and many other elements can
be weighed against each other on a sliding scale. If applied, this model
will result in judicial judgments supported by more revealing reasons
for deferring to agency decisions. Professor Merrill's model preserves
the checks and balances necessary for a smoothly-functioning democratic
government.
Required disclosure of changes in agency positions that result from
executive oversight can enhance both agency and administrative ac-
countability for regulatory decision-making. Such disclosure can be
accomplished through legislative action. 76 Finally, explicit policy guid-
ance from Congress would also help clarify existing ambiguities in the
Clean Water Act. Without a response of some kind, it is likely that
current tension between economic and ecological interests under section
404 will continue unabated. The necessary result of inaction is contin-
ued wetlands loss and heightened dissatisfaction in the regulated com-
munity.
David M. Forman
I?6 See supra note 151, for a list of bills submitted to the second session of the 102nd
Congress to accomplish this goal.
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